"Click fraud" is the practice of deceptively clicking on search ads with the intention of either increasing third-party website revenues or exhausting an advertiser's budget. Search advertisers are forced to trust that search engines do everything possible to detect and prevent click fraud even though the engines get paid for every undetected fraudulent click. We seek to answer whether it is in a search engine's interest to prevent click fraud.
Search advertising revenues grew from virtually nothing in 1996 to more than $7 billion in 2006, constituting 43% of online advertising revenues (Advertising Age 2006). The primary bene…ts of search advertising for advertisers are its relevance and accountability. It tends to reach consumers as they enter the market for the advertised product, and advertisers' ability to track consumers' actions online allows for accurate measurements of advertising pro…tability.
The downside of this accountability is a practice known as "click fraud." Website publishers or rival advertisers may impersonate consumers and click search ads, driving up advertising costs without increasing sales, e¤ectively stealing a …rm's paid advertising inventory. The Click Fraud Network, which de…nes itself as "a community of online advertisers, agencies and search providers," estimated that 14 .8% of all paid clicks in the …rst quarter of 2007 may have been fraudulent.
Discussions with executives in the search advertising industry indicate that the amount of click fraud varies widely across industries and keywords. The perceived threats of click fraud may outweigh the bene…ts of using search advertising for some …rms in high-risk categories.
The primary objective of this paper is to understand how click fraud a¤ects search engines' advertising revenues. We also hope to gain insights into what actions search engines may be able to take to mitigate click fraud. We present an analytical model of the auction market for search advertising keywords and then introduce the possibility that third-party websites or rival bidders may engage in click fraud. The strengths of our model are its parsimony and generality as …rms' search advertising objectives and the degree of competition in keyword auctions vary widely across keywords.
We …nd that when …rms know that x% of all clicks will be fraudulent, they lower their bids by x%. In equilibrium, this adjustment leaves advertising expenditures and the auction result unchanged. However, when the amount of click fraud is uncertain, search engine revenues may increase or decrease. A decrease may occur in relatively competitive keyword auctions as high bidders hedge their advertising budgets lower to protect against the threat of a high realization of click fraud. On the other hand, auction revenues may increase in relatively uncompetitive auctions as the foregone pro…ts of exiting the ad auction may outweigh the e¤ects of click fraud, resulting in a transfer from very pro…table advertisers to the search engine.
It may be di¢ cult to collect evidence of click fraud's e¤ects. When click fraud can be detected, advertisers adversely a¤ected by it could petition search engines to reverse its e¤ects. We pursue a theoretical approach here to avoid this concern.
The surge in internet usage and advertising revenues has attracted substantial academic inter- Research on search advertising has focused mainly on competition in advertising auctions and consumer search. Baye and Morgan (2001) analyzed a homogeneous products market organized by a search engine ("gatekeeper") and showed that the gatekeeper's incentive is to maximize consumer adoption but limit the number of advertisers using the platform since it can extract more revenues when competition among advertisers is lessened. Chen and He (2006) analyzed optimal consumer search and advertiser bid strategies and showed that advertisers'bid order mirrors their products' relevance order. Consumers then optimally engage in sequential search. Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) and Varian (forthcoming) modeled the auction mechanisms used by search engines in extensive detail.
Empirical work on search advertising has focused mainly on the link between keyword prices and advertiser pro…tability. Goldfarb and Tucker (2007) showed that keyword prices increase in advertisers' pro…tability of advertising, and decrease with the availability of substitutable advertising media. Rutz and Bucklin (2007a) developed a model to enable advertisers to decide which keywords to keep in a campaign, and showed that keyword characteristics and ad position in ‡u-ence conversion rates. Rutz and Bucklin (2007b) showed that there are spillovers between search advertising on branded and generic keywords, as some customers may start with a generic search to gather information, but later use a branded search to complete their transaction.
We are not aware of any previous analyses of the e¤ects of click fraud. We begin by discussing the institutional details of the industry that guide our analysis.
Industry Background
In this section, we describe the market for search advertising, types of click fraud, advertiser perceptions of click fraud, and issues in click fraud detection and measurement.
The Search Advertising Marketplace
Search advertising, also known as "cost-per-click" (CPC) or "pay-per-click" advertising, is sold on a per-click basis. Advertisers bid on a word or phrase related to their business and enter a maximum advertising budget per time period. When consumers enter that "keyword" into a search engine or read a third-party webpage relevant to the keyword, the advertiser's ad then may be displayed along with the consumer's search results or webpage content. If the consumer clicks on the advertiser's ad, she is redirected to a web address chosen by the advertiser, and the advertiser is charged a fee.
Advertising costs and quantity of searches available vary widely across keywords.
Search advertising was pioneered by a …rm named Overture, which was later bought by Yahoo.
Overture sold keywords in a public-information, …rst-value auction. It later changed its auction mechanism to a private-value variation on Vickrey's (1961) second-price auction, the Generalized Second Price auction described by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007). The market leaders in search advertising are Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, with 44%, 29%, and 13% of the market, respectively (Advertising Age 2006), but niche players are important in many submarkets.
Keyword prices vary according to advertiser pro…tability, media competition, and keyword characteristics. Though not representative, the keyword "mesothelioma attorney" cost an average of $35 per click, but region-speci…c keyword costs reached as high as $80 per click (Goldfarb and Tucker 2007). Rutz and Bucklin (2007b) illustrate the di¤erences between keywords containing branded and generic terms. In a search advertising campaign for a hotel chain, branded keywords on Google created 3.5 million impressions, 465,311 clicks, and 28,903 reservations at a cost of nearly $80,000. Generic keywords generated 19.9 million impressions, 58,471 clicks, and 587 reservations at a cost of $36,228.
Search ads are typically ranked according to some function of advertisers' willingness to pay and the ads'value to searching consumers. Google's early ranking algorithm was to multiply the advertiser's bid per click by its "click through rate," the number of consumers who clicked on the ad divided by all consumers who saw the ad. This tended to increase the utility of search ads, increasing customer tra¢ c and acceptance of advertising. There is some evidence that higher ad positions are more desirable since not all consumers read through all of the ads. For example, Wilk (2007) reported that 62% of all searchers do not read past the …rst page of ads, and 23% do not read past the …rst few ads. He also noted that consumers often re…ne their search if they do not …nd a good ad among the …rst few slots. Chen and He (2006) …nd that a higher ad listing sends a quality signal to uninformed consumers. Rutz and Bucklin (2007a) demonstrate empirically that higher ad positions result in higher conversion rates.
In late 2006, Google added a "quality score" to its ranking function. The quality score is a function of click-through rate, search term relevance, ad text, and ad landing page, but the speci…c function is not publicly available. Yahoo added a click-through component to its ranking algorithm in 2007 (Shields 2007 ). We do not consider di¤erences between advertisers'click-through rates or quality scores in this paper as their speci…c use is not publicly disclosed, may not be constant across search engines, and may continue to change. We view this as a direction for future research.
Other forms of online advertising include cost-per-thousand (CPM), in which websites are compensated on an impression basis, and cost-per-action (CPA), in which advertisers pay per sale or lead. Prasad (2007) discussed "impression fraud," a problem in CPM advertising that is conceptually similar to click fraud but operationally di¤erent. On the other hand, CPA advertising has the potential to resolve click fraud concerns, though it may have incentive compatibility problems. We do not expect that CPA will completely replace CPC advertising, though it may cannibalize some revenues.
Types of Click Fraud
Search advertisers are charged when their ads are clicked, regardless of who is doing the clicking.
Clicks may come from potential customers, employees of rival …rms, or computer programs. We refer to all clicks that do not come from potential customers as "click fraud." Click fraud is sometimes called "invalid clicks" or "unwanted clicks." This is partly because the word "fraud" has legal implications that may be di¢ cult to prove or contrary to the interests of some of the parties involved. Google calls click fraud "invalid clicks" and says it is "clicks generated through prohibited methods. These prohibited methods include but are not limited to: repeated manual clicks, or the use of robots, automated clicking tools, or other deceptive software." 1 There are several types of click fraud: In ‡ationary click fraud: Search advertisements often appear on third-party websites and pay those website owners a share of advertising revenues. These third parties may click the ads to in ‡ate their revenues.
Competitive click fraud: Advertisers may click rivals'ads with the purpose of driving up their costs or exhausting their ad budgets. When an advertiser's budget is exhausted, it exits the ad auction. A common explanation for competitive click fraud is that …rms have the goal of driving up rivals'advertising costs, but such an explanation may not be subgame perfect.
If committing competitive click fraud is costly, then driving up competitors'costs comes at the expense of driving down one's own pro…ts. A more convincing explanation may be found in the structure of the ad auction. When a higher-bidding advertiser exits the ad auction, its rival may claim better ad positions without paying a higher price per click.
There are myriad other types of click fraud, such as fraud designed to boost click-through rates or to invite retaliation by search engines against rival websites. These other types are thought to be infrequently used, so we do not consider them in this paper. 
Advertiser Perceptions of Click Fraud

Click Fraud Detection and Prevention
Search engines acknowledge they cannot fully detect click fraud. 
A Baseline Model of Search Advertising
We begin with a simple setting to establish how the market operates in the absence of click fraud.
This aids interpretation of equilibrium results when we introduce in ‡ationary and competitive click fraud in later sections.
Clicks We assume there is a …xed period of length one. n customers click the search ad in the top spot and clicks arrive at a constant rate 1 n . Firm j 2 f1; 2g receives jW per customer click when its ad is in the top spot, and jL otherwise. We de…ne j = n( jW jL ) as the total value to advertiser j of remaining in the top spot for the entire period of time. It must be that j > 0 for all j else …rms will never enter positive bids.
Search Advertising Technology Each …rm enters a bid per click, b j , for a single advertising slot sold by a monopoly gatekeeper. The high bidder claims the slot and pays the low bidder's bid per click. The high bidder also enters a capacity, K j , the maximum number of clicks for which it is willing to pay. If the total number of clicks exceeds K j , the high bidder exits the advertising market when its capacity has been exceeded. The low bidder then claims the top spot at the next-highest advertiser's per-click bid, which we normalize to 0.
Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) showed that, with two bidders and one slot, the Generalized Second Price auction used by Google and Yahoo reduces to a Vickrey auction. We will appeal several times to the standard result that, in a second price auction, it is optimal for …rms to bid their reservation price.
We assume the two …rms'ads have identical click-through rates, so the high-bidding advertiser wins the top ad position.
Structure of the Game The game is played in two stages. First, each …rm enters a bid per click and observes its position, with the high-bidding …rm in the top spot. In the second stage, the high bidder sets a capacity K j . The reason for this structure is that, in reality, each …rm may discover its rival's bid immediately by varying its own bid and observing whether its ad position changes, but a rival's capacity may only be discovered after it has been exhausted. We seek a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies under full information.
Capacity Choice We assume, without loss of generality, the two …rms are numbered such that …rm 1 wins the auction and later characterize the conditions under which this event occurs. We …rst derive its optimal capacity choice K 1 and then use that to …nd its optimal bid b 1 .
When …rm 1 wins the auction (W ), its pro…t is
n is the fraction of customer clicks …rm 1 receives while on top in the event it does not remain on top for the entire time period.
1W does not change with K 1 when K 1 n. When K 1 < n, 1W changes linearly with K 1 at rate ( 1W 1L b 2 ). We show below that 1W 1L > b 2 when …rm 1 wins the auction outright, so this rate of change is positive. Firm 1 will set K 1 n, and it will earn n ( 1W b 2 ).
Bids Firm 1 chooses b 1 to make it indi¤erent between winning and losing the auction. That is, b 1 is chosen to equate 1W with …rm 1's pro…t in the event it loses the auction (n 1L ). Thus,
n . We can now state 
Search Advertising with In ‡ationary Click Fraud
We now introduce in ‡ationary click fraud into the baseline model. Search engines often pay thirdparty websites to display search ads relevant to their site content. In ‡ationary click fraud results when those website owners click the ads to in ‡ate their advertising revenues.
We …rst analyze the individual website's problem of choosing a click fraud level. Next, we solve for equilibrium bids and capacities under full information. Finally, we consider the case of stochastic in ‡ationary click fraud.
Websites'Choice of In ‡ationary Click Fraud
Ads associated with a particular keyword are placed on W third-party websites, indexed by w.
We consider two di¤erent compensation schemes. If website w is paid w per click generated, its revenues are w (n w + r w ), where n w is the number of customer clicks generated through the website, and r w is its in ‡ationary click fraud level. If website w is paid a fraction w 2 (0; 1) of the ad revenues it generates, its revenues are w b(n w + r w ), where b is the advertiser's payment per click. b does not vary across websites and is a function of equilibrium click fraud (as shown in section 3.2).
We assume the cost of r w fraudulent clicks is an increasing and convex function c(r w ) since a greater number of fraudulent clicks increases the risk that the search engine will detect the fraudulent activity. The search engine could then retaliate by excluding the website from its content network or initiating a costly legal action against the website if click fraud constitutes a breach of contract.
Under a per-click compensation scheme, website w's pro…ts are
yielding a …rst-order condition w = c 0 1 (r w ) and a choice of r w = c 0 1 ( w ) in equilibrium.
Under a revenue-sharing compensation scheme, assuming W …nite, website w's pro…ts are
and site w's …rst-order condition, w b + w (n w + r w ) @b @rw = c 0 (r w ), yields a unique r w .
Proposition 2 When w = w b, a revenue-sharing compensation scheme will result in less in ‡a-tionary click fraud than a per-click compensation scheme, as it incents content network partners to partially internalize the e¤ ect of in ‡ationary click fraud on advertisers' bids.
Proof. The right-hand sides of site w's …rst-order conditions are identical under the two compensation schemes, but the left-hand side is strictly lower under the revenue-sharing compensation scheme, since @b @rw < 0.
It can be seen that a lower W will increase @b @rw in absolute value, leading to less in ‡ationary click fraud under a revenue-sharing compensation scheme, and no change in click fraud under a per-click compensation scheme. The implications of this result for search engines are clear: click fraud is reduced when search ads are not rotated across a large number of websites, and each website is compensated with a fraction of the advertising revenues it generates.
We can further see that @b @rw is greatest (in absolute value) when W = 1, in essence encouraging the single site on which an ad appears to completely internalize the e¤ect of its click fraud on advertisers' bids. This suggests that search engines should allow advertisers to enter site-speci…c keyword bids b w to reduce sites' incentives to engage in click fraud. While it would be di¢ cult for a human to manage site-speci…c bids when W is large, it is easy to imagine software designed to accomplish this task. Next, we analyze the equilibrium e¤ects of in ‡ationary click fraud on advertisers'bidding strategies.
Deterministic In ‡ationary Click Fraud
We assume here that customers generate n = n 0 + P w n w clicks, where n 0 is the number of customer clicks that come directly from the search engine. Website owners generate r = P w r w in ‡ationary fraudulent clicks.
Capacity Choice When …rm 1 wins the auction, its pro…t is
The …rst segment of the pro…t function represents the outcome in which …rm 1 stays on top for the entire time period. The second segment occurs if …rm 1's capacity will be exhausted at some point, in which case it is on top for n K 1 n+r customer clicks, and has exited the auction for the remaining 1
We show below that 1 n+r > b 2 holds when …rm 1 wins the auction, so this rate of change is positive. Firm 1 will set K 1 n + r and earn n 1W b 2 (n + r). We can see that the auction mechanism completely internalizes the e¤ect of in ‡ationary click fraud when the number of fraudulent clicks is known to both bidders. Advertiser pro…ts are una¤ected; bids adjust endogenously to counter the detrimental e¤ects of the fraudulent clicks. The gatekeeper's revenues are unchanged, though its pro…ts may fall if it uses a per-click compensation scheme since larger transfers would be made to third-party websites.
Bids
Stochastic In ‡ationary Click Fraud
It is perhaps more intuitive to assume that advertisers do not know how many fraudulent clicks will occur since they may not know the distribution of w or n w across websites, and they may not know websites'click fraud costs. We assume here that advertisers maximize expected pro…ts and know the probability density f (r) of the in ‡ationary click fraud level r. 3 Capacity Choice We now add uncertainty about r into …rm 1's pro…t function. If K 1 < n, …rm 1's capacity will be exhausted for any realization of r. When K 1 n, …rm 1's capacity is only exhausted for some realizations of r. Firms maximize expected pro…ts:
The uncertainty in the …rst segment of the pro…t function concerns the number of clicks for which the …rm will remain on top. On the second segment of the pro…t function, the …rst term is the …rm's expected pro…ts when it remains on top, weighted by the probability that r is small enough that …rm 1 is never knocked o¤. The second term is the …rm's expected pro…ts in the event its capacity is exhausted, weighted by the probability that r is large enough to exhaust the …rm's capacity. Figure 1 depicts 1W . For K 1 < n, 1W changes linearly with K 1 at a constant rate
is continuous at K 1 = n though its slope changes at this point.
Firm 1 will choose a K 1 larger than n if
We show later this holds in
0, the …rst-order condition on the second segment of the pro…t function. Figure 2 shows the case when K 1 is …nite. If K 1 < 1, K 1 is increasing in 1 .
For
We can show that if the …rst-order condition is satis…ed, the second-order condition is strictly negative, implying …rm 1's 3 Alternatively, we could interpret f (r) as advertisers'beliefs about the quantity and likelihood of click fraud.
choice of K 1 is unique.
We can substitute this into the SOC to …nd 1 for every term r K 1 n. Thus h R 1
We can therefore see that the SOC is strictly satis…ed whenever the FOC is met.
Bids As before, we calculate b 1 as the per-click payment that makes …rm 1 indi¤erent between acquiring the advertising right and not acquiring it. Thus b 1 is found by setting 1W = 1L . We consider two cases: n < K 1 < 1 and K 1 = 1.
In the …rst case, K 1 will be …nite when the …rms are su¢ ciently similar that M C(K) does not lie everywhere below M R(K). To aid interpretation of the results, we assume symmetry between the two …rms, 1 = 2 = , implying
We …nd b by equating …rm 1's expected winning pro…ts to its expected losing pro…ts, but we now must consider that when …rm 1 loses, it will claim the top spot when n + r > K 2 . Thus
and b is determined by the equality of 1W and 1L . This leads us to Proposition 4 When in ‡ationary click fraud is stochastic, there is no competitive click fraud, and …rms are su¢ ciently similar that the high bidder sets a …nite K, expected gatekeeper revenues are strictly lower than the case when in ‡ationary click fraud is deterministic.
Proof. Gatekeeper revenues are equal to
Note that
The right-hand side is gatekeeper revenues when in ‡ationary click fraud is deterministic.
In the second case, …rm 1 wins and sets a capacity K 1 = 1. This occurs when 1 2 is su¢ ciently large that M R(K 1 ) lies everywhere above M C(K 1 ). We can now state Proposition 5 When in ‡ationary click fraud is stochastic, there is no competitive click fraud, and …rms are su¢ ciently dissimilar that the high bidder sets K j = 1, expected gatekeeper revenues are strictly higher than the case when in ‡ationary click fraud is deterministic.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Uncertainty about the amount of in ‡ationary click fraud may either raise or lower gatekeeper revenues. It is likely to lower gatekeeper revenues when …rms'incremental pro…ts of winning the auction are similar. When …rms'pro…ts are similar (for example in auctions for generic keywords), bidding is more intense and the auction winner pays a higher cost-per-click. High costs per click will induce the auction winner to strategically limit its capacity to avoid paying for a large number of fraudulent clicks.
Gatekeeper revenues may rise with in ‡ationary click fraud when one …rm's pro…ts of winning are much larger than its rival's (for example in auctions for branded keywords). In this case, the high bidder gains very large rents in the baseline model, and its rents are so large that it never chooses to strategically limit its capacity. Click fraud may then have the e¤ect of transferring some of the winner's pro…ts to the gatekeeper.
What we learn in this section is that in ‡ationary click fraud does not harm advertisers when they know exactly how much to expect; this seemingly veri…es the Google CEO's comment that perhaps no solution to click fraud is necessary. However, under the more realistic assumption that …rms face uncertainty in the level of in ‡ationary click fraud, we see two things. First, search engines certainly have a strong incentive to detect and limit click fraud in very competitive keyword auctions. Second, when keyword auctions are less competitive, it may be in the gatekeeper's interest to allow some click fraud.
Search Advertising with In ‡ationary and Competitive Click Fraud
We have previously considered the e¤ects of third-party invalid clicks on market equilibria. Now we extend the analysis to consider what happens when the low bidder may click the high bidder's ad to hasten the high bidder's exit from the advertising auction.
We start by proving our earlier assertion that competitive click fraud may not be subgame perfect in section 4.1. In a model when the number of in ‡ationary fraudulent clicks is known and the number of competitive fraudulent clicks is rationally anticipated, …rm 1 will shade its capacity upward in equilibrium. Assuming click fraud is costly, …rm 2 then will not commit any competitive click fraud.
In section 4.2, we show that uncertainty in the total number of clicks may lead to competitive click fraud in equilibrium if the costs of committing it are not too high. Competitive click fraud unambiguously decreases advertisers'bids, but it also may increase the high bidder's capacity. As we show for two special cases of the model, the net e¤ect on gatekeeper revenues may be positive or negative.
Assumptions About Competitive click fraud We assume the low bidder chooses a level of competitive click fraud, z, at cost c(z). We assume c(z) is increasing and convex since a larger number of clicks will increase the probability that the high bidder or the gatekeeper can verify the identity of the …rm committing click fraud and retaliate (e.g., through civil lawsuits or business channels). 4 We assume the low bidder chooses z simultaneously with the high bidder's choice of K. The total number of clicks is then z + n + r. We seek a rational expectations equilibrium in pure strategies under full information: each …rm anticipates its rival's action.
Deterministic In ‡ationary and Competitive Click Fraud
In the case that r is deterministic and known to both …rms, …rm 1's pro…t when it wins the initial
and …rm 2's pro…t when it loses the initial auction (L) is
These pro…t functions are quite similar to those analyzed in section 3.2. We can now state Proposition 6 When b 1 > b 2 and r is deterministic, K 1 n + z 2 + r and z 2 = 0. Firm 1 never loses the top spot, and …rm 2 therefore does not engage in competitive click fraud.
Proof. Suppose not. If z 2 > 0, …rm 1's pro…t is n 1W
. This is strictly less than the case in which K 1 n + z 2 + r. Therefore, …rm 1 will always increase K 1 until K 1 n + z 2 + r. Firm 2's best response to this strategy is z 2 = 0.
Stochastic In ‡ationary and Competitive Click Fraud
Here we set up the problem under the general distribution f (r) and discuss results and intuition from the general model. We describe the set of equilibria in pure strategies in Appendix 2. 4 One might also posit a competitive click fraud cost function c(z; r), where dc dr < 0; to allow for the probability of competitive click fraud detection to fall with in ‡ationary click fraud. We expect the two types of click fraud can be independently detected, given that website owners' fraudulent clicks will come exclusively from their own sites, while competitive click fraud is more likely to occur on search engines'main pages. The results presented below are virtually unchanged under the assumption that c(z) = c(z; r).
Pro…ts As before, there are two parts to …rm 1's pro…t function. When K 1 < n + z 2 , …rm 1 is always knocked o¤ the top spot. When K 1 n + z 2 , …rm 1 is only knocked o¤ for some realizations of r.
1W is continuous at K 1 = n + z 2 though its slope falls at this point. The problem facing Firm 2 in the case that it loses (L) is choosing z 2 to maximize
2L is continuous at K 1 = n + z 2 though its slope falls at this point.
This leads us to
Proposition 7 Under stochastic in ‡ationary click fraud, if the …xed costs of click fraud are not too high and the high bidder sets a …nite capacity, the low bidder always has an incentive to engage in some click fraud.
Proposition 8 Under stochastic in ‡ationary click fraud, gatekeeper revenues may be increasing or decreasing in the level of competitive click fraud z.
Proof. We prove this proposition with two speci…c examples. In the extreme case that c(z) = 0, the low bidder's best strategy is to set z = 1, yielding no potential pro…t to the high bidder and driving bids to zero. In section 4.3, we investigate a special case of f (r) and c(z) and show that gatekeeper revenues may increase in the level of competitive click fraud.
Uncertainty about r causes two e¤ects. First, it opens the door to competitive click fraud.
As the high bidder shades its capacity downward to protect against the risk of paying for a large number of in ‡ationary fraudulent clicks, the low bidder may pro…tably engage in some click fraud.
This lowers the expected pro…t of winning and raises the expected pro…t of losing, leading to lower bids.
The second e¤ect is that, since z is decreasing in K , the high bidder may shade its capacity upward to deter competitive click fraud. This increase in capacity may lead gatekeeper revenues to rise with z . We show how this mechanism operates for a special case of f (r) and c(z) in section 4.3.
Special case: f (r) discrete and c(z) linear
In this section, we solve a special case of the model for equilibrium K 1 and z 2 . We assume that r =r with probability 1 and r = r with probability , where r< r. This discrete distribution f (r) is the only distribution that yields analytical solutions in this model. We also assume 1 = 2 = and c(z) = cz for simplicity.
Pro…t and reaction functions If …rm 1 wins the auction, we have
(1 )
1W is continuous and piecewise linear. It is ‡at for
We …rst show it can't decrease on the …rst segment and then increase on the second. From the slope expressions, if it did, then
which cannot happen since r < r. Figure 3 shows the three possible shapes 1 can take in K 1 . We can have K 1 = 0, K 1 = n+z 2 +r, or K 1 n + z 2 + r, depending on the shape of 1 . We get the middle case when (by rewriting the slope conditions and evaluating at K 1 = n + r + z 2 )
If the …rst inequality is violated, we get K 1 = 0. If the second inequality is violated, we get
Now consider the auction loser. Firm 2's pro…t function is
Second-order conditions are satis…ed for K 1 < n + r + z 2 .
Equilibrium in K 1 and z 2 We …nd two equilibria in pure strategies. In the …rst, 1W is rising in its third segment, K 1 n + r + z 2 , and z 2 = 0.
The other possibility is that 1W peaks at K 1 = n + r + z 2 , in which case …rm 2 responds according to its …rst-order condition. We then have z 2 = q 2 2 4c 2 + (r r) + 2c n r and
4c 2 + (r r) + 2c r + r. There are three necessary conditions for this equilibrium.
First, it must be that K 1 is in the prescribed range, which implies z 2 < r r. Second, it must be that z 2 > 0. Third, it must be that …rm 2 prefers 2L (K 1 ; z 2 ) to 2L (K 1 ; 0); this implies
The equilibrium level of competitive click fraud is increasing with r and decreasing with c.
Gatekeeper revenues Here we show that gatekeeper revenues may be increasing in the level of competitive click fraud z. Total payments made to the gatekeeper in equilibrium are b K as determined by …rm 1's indi¤erence to winning and losing:
It can be seen that gatekeeper revenues, b K , rise with z .
Managerial Implications
Our analysis has produced several results that could in ‡uence search engines' and advertisers' business practices.
Content network management
We showed that third-party websites' incentives to engage in click fraud are greater when a per-click compensation scheme is used in place of a revenuesharing compensation scheme, and when search ads are rotated across a large number of websites.
Content networks should not only adopt these strategies, they should make them public to increase transparency and build advertiser con…dence.
We found that content network partners'incentives to engage in click fraud are minimized when advertisers may enter site-speci…c bids. Any site that generates a large amount of in ‡ationary click fraud would then be penalized through a lower site-speci…c bid. We are not aware of any content networks that currently allow advertisers to enter site-speci…c bids in CPC auctions, but it seems within the realm of technical possibility.
Advertiser Information We showed that click fraud does advertisers no harm when advertisers have full information. This suggests that search engines should take actions to increase the amount of information at advertisers'disposal. Speci…cally, they can issue keyword-speci…c reports on how and when they punish advertisers and websites suspected of engaging in click fraud, issue keywordspeci…c reports on when and how much click fraud they detect, and give advertisers information about the identity and frequency of the content network sites on which their ads appeared.
Tuzhilin' s "Fundamental Problem of Click Fraud Prevention" Tuzhilin (2006) de…ned the "fundamental problem of click fraud prevention." Search engines may try vigorously to detect and prevent click fraud, but they cannot tell advertisers speci…cally how they do so, as this would constitute explicit instructions on how to avoid click fraud detection.
To resolve this problem, we suggest that the search advertising industry form a neutral third party to authenticate search engines'click fraud detection e¤orts. Such a party could maintain the con…dentiality needed by search engines while allaying advertisers'concerns. In the absence of such a neutral third party, it may be possible to design some creative incentivecompatible contracts to provide veri…able evidence of click quality. For example, if human searchers are each assigned individual-speci…c accounts, advertisers could enter di¤erent bids for clicks made from individuals'accounts, and "anonymous" clicks.
Our result that search engines are sometimes helped, and sometimes hurt, by click fraud reinforces the need for such a neutral third party. It may be that search engines do not apply their click fraud detection algorithms to all keyword auctions equally. Our results suggest that a pro…t-maximizing search engine might exert maximal e¤orts to prevent click fraud in competitive keyword auctions but do less to prevent click fraud in relatively uncompetitive auctions such as those for branded keywords. Or it may be that search engines try vigorously to prevent click fraud but are unable to credibly convey the depths of their e¤orts to concerned advertisers.
We have only modeled one gatekeeper; would competition between gatekeepers resolve the click fraud problem? We think not, for two reasons. First, the "fundamental problem of click fraud detection" could prevent search engines from sending credible signals to advertisers about their click fraud detection e¤orts. Second, so long as advertisers realize pro…ts per click, and consumers are distributed across search engines, the pro…t-maximizing advertiser is likely to buy keywords from all search engines (though its bid may vary across search engines).
Will click fraud destroy the market? Our results suggest that there will always be some click fraud, but it seems unlikely that click fraud will ever completely destroy the search advertising industry. First, we found that when advertisers have full information, they can strategically adjust their bids so as to completely mitigate the e¤ects of click fraud. Second, so long as search engines are able to maintain a positive probability of detecting some click fraud and punishing those responsible, we will see limited click fraud in equilibrium. It seems the CPC business model will likely remain viable in the long run.
Discussion
We have presented the …rst analysis of the e¤ects of in ‡ationary and competitive click fraud on search advertising markets. We found that, when advertisers know the level of in ‡ationary click fraud, they lower their bids to the point that click fraud has no impact on total advertising expenditures. However, when the level of in ‡ationary click fraud is stochastic, total advertising expenditures may rise or fall. They rise when the keyword auction is relatively less competitive since advertising is so pro…table for the high bidder that it is willing to pay to remain on top for any realization of click fraud. Advertising expenditures may fall when the keyword auction is more competitive since the high bidder faces higher advertising costs and therefore shades its capacity downward to protect against paying for large levels of in ‡ationary click fraud. Third-party websites' incentives to engage in in ‡ationary click fraud are reduced when the gatekeeper uses a revenue-sharing compensation scheme and rotates search ads across a smaller number of websites.
We also analyzed the e¤ects of competitive click fraud. We found that when in ‡ationary click fraud is deterministic, a high-bidding …rm may e¤ectively deter its rival from committing click fraud by choosing a large capacity. However, when the number of clicks is stochastic, the high bidder may shade its bid downward and the low bidder can then pro…tably engage in competitive click fraud if the costs of doing so are not too high. We showed that gatekeeper revenues may be increasing or decreasing in the level of competitive click fraud. 0. Therefore, we know that
We can now look at expected gatekeeper revenues,
2 is gatekeeper revenues in the baseline model, so we have shown that gatekeeper revenues are strictly larger when the two …rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent that the high bidder sets an in…nite capacity in spite of uncertain in ‡ationary click fraud.
Appendix 2
Here we solve for the set of post-auction equilibria in pure strategies possible in the general model.
Advertisers'beliefs about the distribution of in ‡ationary click fraud are f (r), and the low bidder may engage in competitive click fraud at cost c(z). We start by drawing the high bidder's reaction function in K, the low bidder's reaction function in z, and …nally analyze where they may cross.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the …rms are numbered such that …rm 1 wins the advertising auction. For K 1 < n + z 2 , 1W changes linearly with K 1 at rate R 1 0 1 f (r)dr n+z 2 +r b 2 . For K 1 > n + z 2 , the rate of change is strictly greater: 
In the …rst case, …rm 1 has to pay more per click than it earns while it is on top, so it never sets a positive capacity. In the second case, …rm 1 earns zero net pro…t per click while on top so it may set any capacity up to n + z 2 . In the third case, …rm 1 pro…ts from remaining on top and sets K 1 > n + z 2 . We focus on this …nal case in what follows, as the …rst two cases are not subgame perfect. If …rm 2 is the low bidder, it must not be the case that b 2 exceeds the high bidder's equilibrium pro…t per click.
As in section 3.3, …rm 1's choice of K 1 > n + z 2 may or may not yield a …nite K 1 . If the …rm's FOC is satis…ed, its SOC implies K 1 is a unique maximum; if not, K 1 = 1: The proof is parallel to that presented in section 3.2, so it is omitted here.
We have characterized …rm 1's response to z 2 and shown that K 1 is unique when K 1 > n + z 2 .
The next question is whether K 1 is increasing or decreasing in z 2 . We can apply the implicit function theorem to @ 1W @K 1 = 0 to …nd that @K @z = 1
(n+z 2 +r) 2 f (r)dr
when K 1 > n + z 2 . The numerator is positive, and the denominator is also positive (this is implied by
@K 2 < 0). For z 2 such that K 1 1 R 1
(n + z 2 + r) 2 f (r)dr > ( 1 K 1 b) f (K 1 n z 2 ), then K 1 slopes downward in z 2 ; otherwise it is increasing. Figure 4 shows …rm 1's reaction function in this case.
The most striking thing about …gure 4 is the possibility that for z 2 large enough, …rm 1's optimal capacity is zero. Next we analyze …rm 2's choice of z 2 :
We can show that the shape of …rm 2's pro…t function implies a unique maximum z . For
f (r)dr (n+z 2 +r) 3 c 00 (z 2 ), which is strictly negative for any z. For K 1 n + z 2 ,
f (r)dr (n+z 2 +r) 3 i c 00 (z 2 ), which may be positive or negative, depending on f (). For K 1 < n + z 2 ; 2L is strictly concave, and for K 1 n + z 2 , 2 may be concave or convex (depending on K 1 and f ). Figure 5 depicts the three possible shapes of …rm 2's pro…t function.
There are three relevant cases for …rm 2's choice of z 2 . First, it might be that the costs of committing click fraud are su¢ ciently high that z 2 = 0. Second, 2L could be convex for K 1 > z 2 + n or globally concave with a maximum in the range K 1 < z 2 + n; then the optimal choice is the z 2 that satis…es 2 R 1 0 (n + z 2 + r) 2 f (r)dr = c 0 (z 2 ). Third, 2L may be globally concave with a maximum in the range K 1 z 2 + n. In this …nal case, we can apply the implicit function theorem to @ 2L @z = 0 to …nd that @K @z < 0. Figure 6 shows …rm 2's reaction function z 2 (K 1 ). We may or may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies in z and K. There are …ve qualitatively di¤erent outcomes, given b, f (r), and c(z). First, the click fraud cost may be su¢ ciently high that z 2 = 0. In this case K 1 = K 0 in …gure 4. Second, we might have 2L such that its global max is in the range K 1 z 2 + n and a crossing between K 1 (z 2 ) and z 2 (K 1 ) above K 1 = z 2 + n.
We will then …nd a unique (z 2 ; K 1 ) combination where z 2 2 (0; z 00 ) and K 1 > n + z 00 . Third, we could have no crossing above K 1 > n + z 2 and z 00 > z 0 . This would result in z 2 = z 00 and K 1 = 0.
Fourth, we could have no crossing above K 1 > n + z 2 and z 00 = z 0 . Then we would get z 2 = z 00 and K 1 = K 1 (z 00 ). Finally, we could have no crossing above K 1 > n + z 2 and z 00 < z 0 . This would yield no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
